Predicting the Divorce Decisions of Young Women Using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth by Smith \u2796, Angela A.
Illinois Wesleyan University
Digital Commons @ IWU
Honors Projects Economics Department
1996
Predicting the Divorce Decisions of Young Women
Using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
Angela A. Smith '96
Illinois Wesleyan University
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by The Ames Library, the Andrew W. Mellon Center for Curricular and Faculty
Development, the Office of the Provost and the Office of the President. It has been accepted for inclusion in Digital Commons @ IWU by
the faculty at Illinois Wesleyan University. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@iwu.edu.
©Copyright is owned by the author of this document.
Recommended Citation
Smith '96, Angela A., "Predicting the Divorce Decisions of Young Women Using the National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth" (1996). Honors Projects. Paper 63.
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/econ_honproj/63
•
 
Predicting the Divorce Decisions
 
of Young Women Using the National
 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth
 
Angela A. Smith 
April 26, 1996
 
Research Honors Project
 
Project Advisor Dr. Michael Seeborg
 
Abstract 
Over recent decades, we have witnessed drastic changes in American family structure. 
This has been due in large part to the rapid rise in divorce rates. Previous studies, such 
as those performed by Gary Becker (1991) and Manser and Brown (1980) have applied 
economic models to divorce and otherfamily structure decisions. Building on the utility 
maximization analysis ofManser and Brown, as adapted by John Ermisch (1993), this 
study uses a logit regression analysis to predict divorce decisionsfor an allfemale 
sample ofrespondents, ages 28 to 36. Data are extractedfrom the National Longitudinal 
Survey ofYouth for this analysis. Economic theory predicts that the probability of 
divorce is directly related to one's opportunity cost to being married Using a woman's 
estimated wage rate as a proxyfor the economic portion ofthis opportunity cost, this 
study hypothesizes that the probability ofa woman seeking divorce will increase with 
increases in her potential wage rate, holding totalfamily income constant. The empirical 
results ofthe study support this hypothesis. 
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I. Introduction 
What/actors contribute to marital instability? At one time this was not a question that 
concerned many economists. However, the established link between poverty rates and family 
structure decisions in the literature, has justified marital instability as a relevant economic concern 
[Heath, 1992; Kneiser et aI., 1988; and Peters, 1993]. Thanks to the work of economist Gary 
Becker, one of the first to apply economics to the study of the family, economic models are now 
being used to analyze family structure decisions. Treating the family as a miniature production 
unit, Becker's efficient household theories have shaped much of the literature on the family. 
The framework developed by Marilyn Manser and Murray Brown (1980), which makes 
use of the concept ofutilities to analyze marital stability, is one such study. The present study 
applies this framework as adapted by John Ermisch (1993) along with Becker's (1991) work, 
concerning household divisions of labor, to the divorce decision. 
This study is carried out with the expectation that income levels and labor participation 
rates of the wife will be important determinants of the divorce decision. Income in the form of 
actual earnings, as well as wages foregone due to marriage, are predicted to be significant 
predictors of the divorce decision. 
The utility possibility frontier and underlying theory is detailed in Section II of the paper. 
Section III provides an account of the data that are used in the empirical analysis. In section IV, 
the logit models instrumental to the study are outlined. Section V provides a discussion of the 
results of those models. Finally, Section VI summarizes the major conclusions of the study and 
suggests possible policy implications. 
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TI. Theoretical Framework 
Gary Becker's 1991 work, which provides an economic analysis of the family, emphasizes 
the importance of household division of labor in creating and maintaining ail efficient household 
that maximizes gains for both partners. This result is due, in part, to the allocation of time 
between home production and market work on the part of each spouse. Becker argues that each 
partner should specialize in the type of production in which he or she has a comparative 
advantage. Based on the facts that men historically have possessed higher earnings power and 
that women possess the ability to bear children, he comes to the conclusion that husbands more 
often have a comparative advantage in market production, while wives have a comparative 
advantage in home production, in a married-couple household (Becker, PjJ. 38-39). 
Gains from forming a joint household through marriage may also be reaped in the form of 
"joint consumption economies" realized in the purchasing of household goods that 
characteristically resemble public goods. These goods include the house itself, but also other 
household goods that can be shared jointly without a decline in consumption per consumer 
(Ermisch, p.354). 
The decision to form a married household or to dissolve one's present marriage should in part 
depend on the perceived and actual gains from time allocation and/or joint consumption. The 
stability of one's marriage, and hence the probability of divorce, is also influenced by the way in 
which the gains to marriage are allocated between spouses. The allocation of time between 
household and labor market production, according to some studies is not only influenced by the 
comparative advantage each partner possesses in an area of production but may be determined by a 
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dominant partner based on individualistic objectives (Manser & Brown, 1980; John Ermisch, 1993). 
To examine marital instability we must first look at the divorce decision. This study 
attempts to analyze the decision to dissolve a marriage from the position of the female partner. In 
other words, what exogenous shocks to a married couple household cause a woman to be more 
likely to end the marriage? The data which are provided by the National Longitudinal Survey of 
Youth (NLSY) do not allow one to determine which partner initiates the divorce in the cases 
where divorce does in fact occur. For the purpose of carrying out this study, I make the 
simplifying assumption that the divorce decision is made by the wife. 
A framework for analyzing marriage decisions is found in the model first developed by 
Manser and Brown (1980) and adapted by John Ermisch (1993). The model assumes utility 
maximization for a given married couple household and is summarized in Figure 1 below. The 
model is best explained by the authors who begin their analysis by-­
examining the marriage decision in a world inhabited by two individuals who may possess 
different utility functions defined over a vector of private goods, shared goods and own 
leisure. Gains to marriage exist if the point representing the maximum possible utility for 
each individual if single, lies inside the utility possibility frontier. If that occurs, the 
individuals must decide on an allocation of resources and distribution ofgains (Manser & 
Brown, p. 32). 
Hence, two individuals can maximize their utilities by forming a joint household through marriage 
and allocating household resources, in other words by choosing to operate at a point on the 
resulting utility possibility frontier. The exact point (point A) along this curve at which a couple 
will choose to exist depends on the shape of the couple's joint preference (V) curve and the 
bargaining position of each spouse. I 
3 
Fi2ure 1: Utility Possibilities Frontier for a Married-Couple Household* 
Ur 
lit 
v 
u. 
U = couple's joint utility
 
U· = couple's optimal utility
 
V =couple's joint prefence curve
 
1 =spouse's alternate utility
 
*Adapted from Ermisch (1993). 
1m 
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For the couple to determine at what point on the utility possibility curve they wilI exist, a 
compromise must be reached as to how resources will be allocated. The range of solutions is 
narrowed by the alternative levels of utility, or 'single state utility' that could be reached if either 
spouse chose not to form the household. These points are represented by If and I.n in Figure 1. If 
is the utility the female partner would experience from choosing to live independently or choosing 
to form a household with someone else, while 1m refers to the male partner's alternative utility. 
Consequently, the divorce decision will be influenced by factors that affect the shape or 
position of the joint utility curve or the alternative utilities of either partner. As Ermisch points 
out, any change in the prices of consumer goods or change in the wages or salary of either spouse 
will cause the frontier to shift (Ermisch, p.355). 
In any choice-theoretic model, opportunity cost plays an important role in the decision­
making process. In this analysis, potential income is evaluated as an opportunity cost to staying 
married. Income is divided into three components for the purposes of this study, potential or 
predicted wage of the respondent, actual hourly wage of the respondent, and other income. Other 
income would include spouse's earnings, government income transfers, inheritance or other non­
earned income. 
An increase in a woman's potential earnings (i.e. what she could earn if the marriage 
imposed no constraints on her earnings potential or if she were not married) relative to her actual 
income is expected to influence marital stability. The effect can be depicted graphicalIy as a shift 
upward in If' which narrows the bargaining range, thereby increasing the probability of divorce. 
Thus, when holding actual income constant, predicted wages are directly related to the probability 
ofdivorce. This is the case since a woman's earnings potential outside of marriage is part of the 
5
 
opportunity cost to staying married, given that the women is unable to realize her full earnings 
potential within marriage. 
A woman's actual earnings are also expected to influence her likelihood of divorce. The 
reason being that, as Becker explains, "women with higher earnings gain less from marriage than 
other women do because higher earnings reduce the demand for children and the advantages of 
the sexual division oflabor in marriage" (Becker, p. 336). The increase in the wife's actual 
earnings can also be represented in the diagram in Figure 1 as a shift upward in If (from If to I'f), 
since higher earnings increases the wife's next best alternative to marriage. The reasoning here is 
that higher earnings allow a woman to be more sufficient as a single household and also make her 
more marketable for remarriage. However, the positive shock to total family income as a result of 
her earnings increase causes the couple's utility frontier to shift outward (see Figure 1), either 
partially or completely off-setting the rise in If by widening the bargaining range and reducing the 
likelihood of divorce. 
Recall that 1m and If represent the next best alternative to marriagt~ for the male and 
female partner, respectively. This alternative may be forming an independent household,or 
forming a household with someone else. If there are gains to be made from forming another 
household, then the difference in relative utilities can be perceived as part of the opportunity cost 
to staying married. This being the case, the wage of the husband relative to other men in the 
marriage pool should influence the probability of a woman seeking divorce. If a husband's wages 
fall relative to other men in the labor market the probability of his wife divorcing him should 
increase, holding all else constant. 
For example, in a relationship where the husband is specializing in market production and 
6 
-the wife in home production, a drastic drop in the husband's earnings, will greatly impact the 
efficiency of the household and the gains to staying married will be largely reduced. (Graphically, 
this can be depicted as an inward shift of the utility possibilities frontier pictured in Figure 1). 
This scenario also depends on the market for marriageable males available to the wife. If the 
husband's drop in earnings is due to a general decline in the economy and many other men in the 
area are affected, the wife's alternatives are reduced (If falls along with the joint utility curve) and 
the opportunity cost to staying married lowered. Given this scenario, a drop in the husband's 
income would not increase the probability of the respondent seeking divorce. It is the relative 
change in income, not the absolute change, that should affect the opportunity cost to staying 
married. 
While the income of a woman's husband relative to other men in the marriage market 
represents one component of the opportunity cost to marriage, the advent of programs such as 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) has created an alternative source of income for 
unmarried or divorced mothers. AFDC as well as other forms of income transfers from the 
government add an additional component to the opportunity cost to staying married. Under the 
scenario described above, if a couple was to experience an unexpected loss in income due to the 
husband's unemployed status, even if the wife's prospects for remarriage are poor the woman may 
do better by divorcing her husband and collecting AFDC than by staying married. The 
opportunity to remarry or to receive income transfers, both ofwhich "raise the welfare available 
outside the household, also affect allocation and distribution within the household" and could 
cause the gains from marriage to disappear altogether (Ermisch, p. 356). The effect of AFDC on 
a woman's alternate utility can be seen as a shift from If to I'f in Figure 1. 
7 
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Given the utility framework described above and Becker's theory relating to divisions of 
labor, the exogenous factors that are most likely to have an impact on marital dissolution are 
those factors "which reduce the incentives to specialize," and therefore "increase the risk of 
dissolution by reducing the gains from the household division oflabour" (Ermisch, p.357). The 
amount of time spent in labor market production and the number of children a couple has are two 
such exogenous factors. 
Becker's assertion that a married household operates most efficien~ly when the wife 
specializes in home production and the husband in market production, implies that any deviation 
from this would lead to a less stable household (Becker, pp. 37-48). This being the case, an 
additional hour spent in labor market production by a woman whose husband specializes fully in 
labor market production will increase the probability of divorce. 
Since rearing a family together is one of the incentives for a couple to marry, it is 
reasonable to expect the number of children a couple has to affect whether or not that couple 
stays together. Some findings even indicate that divorce rates are higher among couples without 
children. As Ermisch asserts, one reason for this is that the "efficiency loss associated with 
divorce provides an incentive to continue the marriage for couples with children, but this added 
incentive does not exist for childless couples" (Ermisch, p. 361). 
An increase in the wife's human capital, either in the form of additional years of schooling, 
or increases in work experience should increase her single state utility (i.e., If shifts upward), by 
raising her potential earnings power and thereby increasing her ability to support an independent 
household. Since education is already reflected in the predicted and actual earnings of each 
respondent in the model, we are controlling for the effect of increases in education on potential 
8
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and actual earnings. However, education is also expected to influence the tastes and preferences 
of a woman regarding marriage. Evidence of this is the finding by Bennet, Bloom and Craig 
(1989) that black women with more education are more likely to marry than black women with 
less education, while white women with more education are less likely to marry than white women 
with less education. This finding supports the notion that one's level of education can affect one's 
tastes for being married and/or staying married. 
Other factors may influence the divorce decision by affecting one's taste and preferences 
for staying married. These preferences certainly vary from person to person, but may also be 
affected by ones family background, race, religion, community, and age. 
In short, theory from Becker and Ermisch suggests that the probability of a woman 
seeking divorce is influenced by her opportunity cost to being married, the amount of time she 
spends in the labor market, individual wages, and total family income. The above discussion of 
these theories lead to the following research hypotheses: 1.) An increas.e in a married woman's 
earnings potential (or predicted earnings) will increase the probability of a woman seeking divorce 
when holding actual earnings and other family income constant. 2.) An increase in the amount of 
time a woman spends in labor market production will lead to an increase in the probability of 
divorce, when holding total income and potential earnings constant. 3.) An increase in other 
income (income in excess of the wife's earnings) will lead to a decrease in the probability of 
divorce, holding other things constant. 
Other literature suggests that additional factors are important determinants of divorce. 
These factors and their proposed effects on divorce are summarized in the following hypotheses: 
4.) The more dependent children a couple has, the less likely the wife is to seek divorce. 5.) The 
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more years of education a woman has the more likely she is to seek divorce. 6.) The higher the 
unemployment rate (and therefore the fewer eligible men available for remarriage) in the 
respondent's community, the less likely a woman is to seek divorce. 
The respondent's culture, family background, region of residence, age and religion are also 
hypothesized to affect her preference for marriage and thus her probability of seeking divorce. 
For this reason proxies for these characteristics are included as controls for preferences in the 
third empirical model. 
III. Data 
To test these hypotheses, data are used from the National Longitudinal Survey ofYouth2 
(NLSY), which surveys young people (ages 14 to 22 in 1979) annually, from 1979 to 1993. The 
advantage ofusing NLSY data is that it allows the researcher to follow the decision making 
patterns of each respondent over time. I selected a sample of6,283 women from the 12,686 total 
respondents included in the sample. Of this group, 1,447 were included in the empirical analysis, 
while the other cases were discarded due to missing responses. 
It is also important to note that the NLSY samples include suppleinentary samples that 
provide an over-representation of poor respondents and ofblack and Hispanic respondents (1994 
NLS Handbook). For this reason the findings of the analysis carried out in this study may not be 
reflective of the national population as a whole. However, these supplementary samples allow 
one to observe more closely the effects of culture and poverty on marital decisions. 
10 
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IV. Empirical Model 
A logistic regression model3 is used to predict the probability of 1993 divorce decisions 
for the female sample of respondents, based on 1992 conditions, when controlling for family 
background and demographic characteristics. Table 1 below summarizes the variables included in 
the models, their definitions and expected signs. 
The base model for this study, Model I, includes only the variables central to the above 
hypotheses. These variables and are those relating to earnings (PREDWAGE and ACTLWAGE), 
family income (OTHER_rand TOTAL_Y) and labor market participation (LABOR). Models II 
and III contain additional variables whose inclusion is dictated by the theory discussed above and 
drawn from the relevant literature. 
To Model II, DIVPARNT, #CHILD, and EDUCATE were added. Finally, Model III 
contains all of the explanatory variables (excluding TOTAL_Y) and all of the control variables 
listed above, excluding WORKEXP, which is used only in the wage regression. Note also that 
two versions ofModel I are presented in the results section. Version A ofthe model contains 
ACTLWAGE and OTHER_Y, while in version B of the model these variables are replaced by 
TOTAL_Y, which has as a component each respondent's annual contribution to family income for 
1992. 
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Table 1: Variable Definitions 
(Expected Sign) Independent Variables 
(N/A) DIVORCED 
(+) PREDWAGE 
(+) ACTLWAGE 
(+) LABOR 
(-) #CHILD 
(+) EDUCATE 
(-) UNEMPLOY 
(+) URBAN 
(?) NEAST 
(?) SOUTH 
(?) WEST 
(+) POOR78 
(+) DIVPARNT 
(+) BLACK 
(?) HISPANIC 
(+) WORKEXP 
(-) AGE 
(-) CHURCH 
I if married in 1992 but divorced or separated from spouse by 1993; 
oothelwise 
The hourly wage that the married women are predicted to be making ifnot married for 1992 
The actual wage rate that the married women are working for 
Potential annual income if not married divided by the respondents actual 1992 arumal 
income while married 
Total income less annual income of the respondent from wages and salary 1992 
Labor participation of the respondent, proxied by the number of hours the respondent works 
per week as of 1992 
The number of children the respondent has that are under the age of six in 1992 
respondent's highest grade completed as ofMay 1992 
The unemployment rate of the respondent's county in 1992 
I if respondent's residence is in an urban area; 0 if residence-i') rural 
I if respondent lives in the north eastern region of the U.S.; 0 otherwise 
I if respondent lives in the southern region of the U.S.; 0 otherwise 
I if respondent lives in the western region of the U.S.; 0 otherwise 
I if respondent or respondent's family was living below the poverty line in 1978; 
ootherwise 
I if respondent's parents were divorced before the respondent was age 18; 0 otherwise 
1 if respondent is Black; 0 otherwise 
1 if respondent is Hispanic; 0 otherwise 
The average number of weeks the respondent worked per year for the years worked from 1979 to 
1992 
respondents age at 1992 interview date 
1 if the respondent attends religious services several times a year or more; 0 if the respondent does 
not attend at all 
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-The key variables in the model are those relating to wages and income. This is the case, 
since it is this study's hypothesis that the way in which a married couple chooses to allocate 
resources is influenced by each partner's income contribution and by the opportunity cost to 
forming the household. Analyzing the divorce decision from the wife's perspective we proxy the 
opportunity cost to forming the household with PREDWAGE, the predicted wage of the female 
spouse had she chosen to remain single or to divorce her husband. This variable is estimated by 
performing Ordinary Least Squares on the following regression equation: 
PREDWAGE = ao+ a/URBAN) + a2(POOR78) + alBLACK) + a4(HISPANIC) + aj(NEASTj 
+ alSOUTH) + alWESTj +P/WORKEXP) + PlEDUCATE) + Pl#CHILD) + e. 
PREDWAGE is estimated for all 1,043 non-married women in the sample based on 1992 hourly 
wages. The resulting estimated coefficients are then used to compute PREDWAGE for each of 
the married women in the sample. 
Since PREDWAGE represents, in part, the opportunity cost of a woman getting married, or 
staying married, one would expect the probability of divorce to increase with increases in 
PREDWAGE, when actual wages (ACTLWAGE) or total family income (TOTAL_Y), which contains 
actual annual wages and spouse's income, are held constant. We hold income constant when analyzing 
the effect of predicted wages on DIVORCE, because increases (decreases) in family income work 
against the effect of increases (decreases) in PREDWAGE by widening (narrowing) the bargaining 
range and thereby reducing (increasing) the probability of divorce. Other income (0THER_Y) which 
contains the husbands income and non-earned income for the household, but which excludes the 
13 
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respondent's contribution to household income may also be included in the model in place of 
TOTAL Y 
Both TOTAL_Yand OTHER_Yare expected to have a negative et:ect on the divorce decision. 
Increases in income should shift the couple's joint utility curve out and increase the couple's bargaining 
range for allocating benefits, thus making divorce less likely (recall Figure 1). 
The woman's participation in labor market production, LABOR, is also an important factor in 
the divorce decision. Recall from the theoretical discussion that strict divisions of labor within 
marriage increase the gains from marriage and the probability that a couple will stay together. If this 
theory holds, then increases (decreases) in LABOR, particularly for women with husbands working 
full-time, should increase (decrease) the probability of divorce. The logic here lies in the assumption 
that divisions oflabor are one of the primary economic incentives for couples to form a marriage. By 
not choosing the most efficient way to divide labor, each spouse specializing in the area in which he or 
she has a comparative advantage, the couple has less incentive to stay marr~ed. 
The theory also suggests that the number of children a couple has will increase the gains to 
marriage. Economies of scale, in terms of sharing household goods, and divisions of labor become 
more important for large families. Consequently, one expects an inverse relationship to exist between 
the number of children a couple has (#CHILD) and the probability of the wife seeking divorce. 4 
Recall from the utility possibility framework discussed previously, that the effects of these 
variables on the probability of divorce relate to each variable's influence on the gains to marriage. 
Those factors for which increases reduce the gains to marriage (e.g. PREDWAGE, LABOR) increase 
the probability of divorce, while those that increase the gains to marriage (e.g. TOTAL_Y, #CHILD) 
decrease the probability of divorce. 
14 
The proxy for the respondent's education, EDUCATE, is the highest grade completed by the 
respondent as ofMay 1992. The respondent's level of education is hypothesized to act on divorce 
primarily through its effect on her tastes/preferences for marriage. In which direction marital stability 
is influenced, however, may depend on other characteristics of the respondent. A positive prediction 
is made, since in general, increases in education should increase a woman's opportunities in the 
marriage market, thereby making remarriage a more viable option and increasing her alternative utility 
(If from Figure 1). EDUCATE is included in Models II and III. 
The variable UNEMPLOY, which does not come into the analysis until Model III, is the 
unemployment rate of the respondent's county as of 1992. Since Ermisch argues that part of the 
alternative to not forming a married household is to form a household with someone else, the market 
of marriageable men available to the wife represents part of the opportunity cost to divorce. Hence, 
marital stability from the wife's perspective may be partly influenced by how well the husband is doing 
relative to other men in the market. UNEMPLOY serves as a rough proxy for this opportunity cost. 
William Julius Wilson (1987) also documents the importance of community effects on marriage 
rates. He finds that in communities where there are higher levels of unemployment and hence fewer 
"marriageable" men, single motherhood is high and marriage rates low. Hclding all else constant, 
particularly the husband's income, increases in UNEMPLOY, will decrease the likelihood of divorce. 
Controls for family background, DIVPARNTand POOR 78, are added to the analysis in Models 
II and III, respectively. DIVPARNT is a binary variable for if the respondent's parents became 
separated or divorce before the respondent reached age 18. The inter-generational effect of divorce 
(i.e., the fact that children of divorce are more likely themselves to be divorced), leads one to expect a 
positive sign on the coefficient for DIVPARNT. 
15 
POOR78 is a binary variable that proxies whether or not the respondents family was poor in 
1978. The instability that often exists in poor families may lead to early marriage among children of 
poor parents and poorer decision regarding marriage may result. Consequently, one would expect the 
coefficient on POOR78 to have a positive sign. 
Controls for region are included in the final model (Model III) also as a control for variance in 
preferences toward marriage across region of the United States. The dummy variables, NEAST, 
SOUTH, and WEST (North Central being the omitted region) may also serve as a rough proxy for 
variance in divorce laws across states. The expected signs for these variables are undetermined. 
URBAN, is also a dummy variable whose value is determined by the location of the 
respondent's residence in an urban or rural area of the United States. This variable is included as a 
rough proxy for community or neighborhood effects that may influence attitudes toward marriage or 
divorce. For example, there may be more social stigma attached to divorce in a small-town where 
members of a community tend to be more well known, than in a large city.. Marriage markets are 
likely to differ with an urban or rural location. For instance, the alternatives to marriage may be 
restricted for those living in a rural area where populations are lower. Both conditions would result in 
a positive coefficient on URBAN (Model III), with divorce being more likely for those living in urban 
environments. 
Controls for race, BLACK and HISPANIC are also included in Model III. These variables 
were created as dummy variables with whites being the omitted group. The variables are included to 
pick up any cultural difference that may influence preferences toward being married. According to 
Becker, any differences in marital instability between Blacks and Whites would be due to the fact that 
the earnings gap between men and women is smaller among blacks than it is for whites (Becker, 
16 
p.336). This leads to higher divorce rates among Blacks. This would lead one to expect a positive 
sign for the coefficient on BLACK, while HISPANIC is uncertain. 
The variable CHURCH is included in Model III also in an attempt to proxy cultural differences 
among respondents, or to serve as a crude proxy for levels of morality. Although earlier models not 
reported here used dummy variables for Catholic and Protestant to proxy religious differences, in an 
attempt to simplify the model, these were replaced by CHURCH. It takes the value of one if the 
respondent attends religious services several times a year or more versus not at all. The church may 
also serve as a mechanism for increasing marital stability among married couples by providing free 
counseling services or my imposing its own sanctions on divorce (e.g. the practice of 
excommunication by the Catholic church against couples who divorce). 
Finally, each respondent's age as of the 1992 survey date (AGE), is included as a control for 
changes in individual preferences toward marriage that may occur with age and or increased levels of 
maturity. Since increases in age also lower a woman's prospects in the marriage market and reduce 
the amount of time left to reap the benefits of forming a new household (Becker, p.335), the 
probability of divorce should lessen over time. This relationship should hold more strongly for more 
mature samples. 
Table 2, below, provides summary statistics on the sample of 1,447 women respondents. The 
mean values are all based on 1992 data, while the sub-samples, Divorced and Married are based on the 
respondent's marital status as surveyed in 1993. Although, theory suggests that families with lower 
incomes should be more prone to instability, such a large gap in the income between the families in 
which couples seek divorce and those families which remain intact indicates a possible problem. 
I suspect that there may be a problem in the data such that the model is not a perfectly 
17 
recursive model. Ideally, the dependent variable, DIVORCED, would only take on non-zero values 
for those respondents who got divorced in 1993. But since the exact dates for when divorce occurred 
were not provided in the survey one can not be certain as to the time of divorce. In actuality, some of 
the divorces may have occurred during 1992, the year for which annual income is reported. Given the 
relatively small number of divorcees in the sample (62 women) even if this occurred with only a few 
cases, the effect may be large enough to bias the regression results somewhat. Consequently, the 
income data for divorced respondents may be biased downward, causing an upward bias in the 
significance levels of the income coefficients in the regression results. 
Table 2: Summary Statistics on Sample 
DIVORCED MARRIED COMBINED 
mean values 
TOTAL_Y $23,658 $51,891 $50,681 
OTHER_Y $2,752 $33,455 $32,139 
PREDWAGE $9.76 $10.57 $10.54 
ACTLWAGE $11.53 $10.84 $10.87 
LABOR (hrs/week) 36 35 35 
#CHILD 1.4 1.6 1.6 
EDUCATE (years) 13.0 13.3 13.3 
AGE 30.4 31.0 31.0 
% of sample 
BLACK 
HISPANIC 
DIVPARNT 
POOR78 
CHURCH 
URBAN 
25.8 
17.7 
41.9 
24.2 
85.5 
79.2 
17.7 
19.0 
31.0 
16.4 
83.0 
79.0 
18.0 
19.0 
31.4 
16.7 
83.1 
79.2 
= 
sample size 62 1,385 1,447 
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Table 2 also includes the racial make-up of the sample. Note that about one quarter of the 
divorced women in the sample are black compared to only about 18 percent of the complete sample. 
It is also interesting to note that the condition of coming from a divorced household is more prevalent 
among the divorced sub-sample than among those who remain married. 
v. Resultss 
The Ordinary Least Squares regression on PREDWAGE, resulted in the parameter estimates 
that are used to compute predicted wages for the sample of married women. The 1,043 women used 
in the sample to estimate predicted wages were single women who were employed during 1992. The 
resulting equation is as follows: 
PREDWAGE == -2.17928 + 1.08261 (URBAN) - 0.87317(pOOR78) - 12.01926 (BLACK) + 
0.4075(HISPANIC) + 4.06752(NEAST) - 0.00545115(SOUTH) + 0.92745(WEST) + 
+ 0.08038(WORKEXP) + 0.65639(EDUCATE) - 0.43784(#CHILD) . 
Sample size = 1,043 AdjustedR-square = 0.14 
According to the model adjusted R-square, however, this model explains about 14 percent of the 
variation in wages for the unmarried female sample. Thus, PREDWAGE is by no means a perfect 
proxy for the potential earnings of married women. 
The results ofModel I are presented in Table 3, below. Recall that Model I contains only the 
variables related to this study's central hypotheses that income (both actual and potential) and the 
amount of time devoted to labor market production by the wife will have a significant effect on marital 
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stability. It is evident from the results reported in Table 3 that version A of the base model is a much 
better predictor of divorce, predicting almost 70 percent of the divorce decisions in our sample 
correctly, compared with only a 3 percent success rate for version B of the model. However, on 
marital decisions, overall, the models were more comparable, both predicting more than 95 percent of 
marital decisions. This is also evident from the fact that the -2 log Iikelihood6 value is much lower for 
Model I-A, then for version B of the base model. 
Table 3: Logit Regression Results for Base Model 
Independent Expected Estimated Coefficient
 
Variable Sign (standard error)
 
MODEL I-A MODEL I-B 
LABOR + -0.011 0.025*** 
(0.015) (0.011) 
PREDWAGE + 0.092* 0.171*** 
(0.063) (0.051) 
ACTLWAGE + -0.002 N/A 
(0.010) 
OTHER_Y -0.0003*** N/A 
(0.00003) 
TOTAL_Y N/A -0.0001*** 
(0.00002) 
Constant N/A -0.196 -2.19 
(0.806) (0.610) 
% Correct 97.7% 95.7% 
-2 Log Likelihood 230.4 392.5 
Sample Size 1447 1447 
* significant at the 0.10 level 
** significant at the 0.05 level 
***significant at the 0.01 level 
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It is interesting to note that in Model I-A the coefficients on the explanatory variables, LABOR 
and ACTLWAGE do not display the expected signs, although neither of the variables are statistically 
significant predictors ofdivorce in this model. Notice, however, that when ACTLWAGE and 
OTHER_Yare replaced by TOTAL_Yin Model I-B, LABOR becomes significant at the 0.01 level and 
positive, as predicted. In other words, when holding total family income (TOTAL_Y) and potential 
wages constant, additional hours worked by the wife contribute to the instability of the marriage by 
making divorce more likely. 
This result is consistent with Becker's theory concerning divisions of labor in the household. 
Recall Becker's assertion that marriages are more stable when one partner fully specializes in labor 
market production and the other in household production. However, the adverse effect of an increase 
in hours worked on marital stability will be offset by the favorable effect of the addition to total family 
income. If total income is allowed to increase with an increase in the wife'~ labor participation rate, 
then marital stability should improve. Recall also from the utilities possibilities framework discussed in 
Section II, that the frontier shifts outward due to an increase in earnings and may offset the upward 
shift ofIe. But by not allowing the frontier to shift, the upward shift ofIe narrows the bargaining 
range and makes divorce more likely. 
Both versions of the model were estimated for Models II and III, as well. The discrepancies 
between the two versions of the model persisted across all three models. Although version A of the 
models performs better at predicting divorce within the sample, version B produces significant 
parameter estimates for the key coefficients. Consequently, one can conclude that version B does a 
better job at explaining the occurrence of divorce. Since this study is primarily concerned with 
determining the factors that explain the divorce decision, the remaining discussion will focus on 
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version B of the models. Also note that only the results ofversion B are presented for Models II and 
III in Table 4, below. 
The results of Model II are presented in the first column of Table 4. Notice that additional 
explanatory variables have been added to the analysis. The utility maximizing framework discussed 
earlier provides theoretical support for adding #CHILD, DIVPARNT, and EDUCATE to the base 
model to form Model II. All three of the newly added variables perform well in Model II. Each of the 
three coefficients also displays the correct signs. Recall from the utility possibilities frontier 
discussion, that increases in the number of children in a family reduce the probability of divorce by 
adding to the gains from marriage. This is confirmed by the negative coefficient on #CHILD. And 
since a woman with a higher level of education should have more options available to her outside of 
marriage (and thus a higher alternate utility), the sign on the coefficient for EDUCATE is positive as 
expected. Finally, because a child of divorced parents, tends to have a higher probability ofhaving a 
marriage end in divorce, the sign on DIVPARNT is positive as expected. 
PREDWAGE losses its significance, however, when the latter three variables (#CHILD, 
DIVPARNT, and EDUCATE) are added to the model. This is probably due to the fact that much of 
the effect of the respondents level of education and number of children on marital stability is through 
PREDWAGE, especially since both variables are also used in the estimation of PREDWAGE for this 
study. 
The final regression analysis (see column 2 of Table 4) measures the effect ofLABOR, 
PREDWAGE, and TOTAL_Yon the probability ofdivorce, when controlling for region, race, religion, 
age and community effects. While, this more complete model does improve the fit of the model (the 
-2 log likelihood falls to 375.5) none of the control variables prove statistically significant. 
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Table 4: Logit Regression Results for Expanded Models 
• 
Independent Expected Estimated Coefficient
 
Variable Sign (standard error)
 
MODEL II MODEL III 
LABOR + 0.020** 0.020** 
(0.012) (0.012) 
PREDWAGE + 0.079 0.149* 
(0.070) (0.097) 
TOTAL_Y -0.0001*** -0.0001*­
(0.00001) (0.00001) 
#CHILD -0.243** -0.195 
(0.142) (0.156) 
DIVPARNT + 0.479* 0.524­
(0.294) (0.304) 
EDUCATE + 0.185- 0.135* 
(0.090) (0.104) 
POOR78 + N/A 0.368 
(0.380) 
UNEMPLOY N/A -0.180 
(0.169) 
CHURCH N/A 0.396 
(0.410) 
BLACK + N/A -0.288 
(0.394) 
HISPANIC ? N/A -0.079 
(0.450) 
AGE N/A -0.040 
(0.068) 
URBAN + N/A 0.287 
(0.374) 
NEAST ? N/A -0.931 
(0.746) 
SOUTH ? N/A -0.302 
(0.359) 
WEST ? N/A -0.323 
(0.499) 
Constant N/A -3.264 -1.827 
(1.094) (2.524) 
% Correct 95.8% 95.6% 
-2 Log Likelihood 383.0 375.5 
Sample Size 1,447 1,447 
*significant at the 0.10 level - 0.05 level *** 0.01 level 
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Model III also predicts that blacks, Hispanics, those from poor families, and those respondents 
who live in urban areas, as expected, have less stable marTiages than their respective counterparts. 
Unexpectedly, however, church-goers are more likely to divorce, according to the model. Again these 
findings are not statistically significant. Meanwhile, those women who live in communities with 
higher rates of unemployment and are older in age have lower probabilities of divorcing their 
husbands, as was expected. 
VI. Conclusions 
In summary, the results of this study confirm the principal hypotheses that a woman's earnings 
potential and the amount of time she spends in labor market production do contribute to marital 
instability. However, an even more interesting result is that these relationships hold only when total 
family income is held constant. One possible explanation may be that the effect of additional work by 
a wife on marital stability is more than offset by the increase in income that results. If this is the case, 
an increase in labor production by the wife (LABOR) will add to the stability of the marriage. This 
finding would then counter Becker's theory that strict divisions of labor are necessary for maintaining 
an efficient and stable household. The magnitude of these offsetting effects is an interesting area for 
future research. 
Another interesting finding of the study, although not the primary focus of this paper, is that 
there do not seem to be any cultural or racial divisions in divorce decisions with all of the controls in 
place. Regressing the controls for race against divorce without any other independent variables does 
reveal that there are differences along racial lines in black and white divorce rates in the sample 
(BLACK is significant at the 0.1 level).7 However, as soon as income and hours worked are factored 
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into the equation BLACK is no longer significant. This suggests that most of the disparity in family 
structure is due to the income gap between black and white families. 
The possibilities for future research in this area are varied. The present study was based on a 
neoclassical framework which posits the decisions to specialize in home production and to remain in a 
marriage as choices based on relative gains. However, Julia Heath (1990) presents an alternative way 
oflooking at the relationship. She argues that "based on the historical ann traditional power 
distribution of the patriarchal family structure," the woman's alternatives are often limited to the point 
where they can not be considered rational choices (Heath, p. 107). 
Other future research, as Elizabeth Peters (1993) explores might isolate income from welfare, 
alimony, and child support as alternative income variables influencing divorce decisions. 
Previous research indicates that keeping families intact is key to fighting poverty, particularly 
among women and children. However, the findings of the present study indicate that lower-income 
families are in fact more prone to marital instability. The circularity here suggests that for any policy 
to be effective it must attack the problem from both sides. This means implementing policy to create 
greater incentives for married couples to stay together, while fighting poverty at the same time. 
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Notes 
1. It is interesting to note that marital stability may also be influenced by whether or not the 
couple allocates resources in an egalitarian manner (e.g. Nash-bargained solution) or in a 
dictatorial manner in which one partner dominates. The effect of the couple's bargaining solution 
on their joint utility is a concept discussed more at length in Manser and Brown (1980) and 
Ermisch (1991). It is not included in the empirical analysis here because the power relationship 
between spouses is difficult to model. It is an area that I must leave for future research. 
2. The NLSY database is available on CD-ROM from The Center for Human Resource Research 
at The Ohio State University. 
3. A logit model is used here since the dependent variable in the model, DIVORCED, is binary 
taking only values of zero and one. The logit model works better in estimating a dichotomous 
dependent variable than a linear model such as OLS since it restricts predicted values to be 
between zero and one. The model has the functional form In[P/(1-P)] = a + pX + u, where Pis 
the probability of the event (e.g. divorce) occurring. [For a more detailed discussion oflogits see 
Gujarati, pp. 481-491 or Ramanthan, pp. 279-280]. 
4. A potential flaw in this argument is that the data do not allow us to determine if the wife or the 
husband is the spouse seeking divorce. Thus, while a women with dependent children may be less 
likely to seek divorce, the opposite is likely to be true for her husband. Although we assume that 
in the case of abandonment by her husband, a women that receives higher utility from being 
married would quickly seek remarriage, for a woman with young children one's prospects in the 
marriage market are limited. 
5. The significance levels for all of the logit regression results are based on the Wald statistic, 
which is calculated by dividing each coefficient by its standard error and squaring the quantity. 
6. Since a perfect likelihood value would be one, the -2 log likelihood val.Je should be close to 
zero for a model with a high goodness of fit. Although, the -2 log likelihoc.d values are very far 
from zero for all of the regression equations in this study, this is expected :~ince there are 
obviously many factors that affect divorce that can not be modeled. However, since lower -2 log 
likelihood values are preferred we can use this statistic to evaluate the relative effectiveness of 
each model with respect to the others. 
7. Results not presented in the paper. 
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